Positivism

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In the 1950s and 1960s, there were two main categories of theories called meta-theories: positivism and critical theory. Positivism was associated with a naturalistic and pragmatic approach to modern thought, while critical theory was linked to phenomenology and hermeneutics. Positivism was dominant in English-speaking countries and Scandinavia, while critical theory prevailed in Germany, France, and Spanish-speaking countries.

Positivism as a philosophy was originally proposed by Auguste Comte in the 1820s and 1830s, drawing on the earlier ideas of Saint Simon. Its main goal was to distinguish science from metaphysics and religion. Positivism emerged as a response to the negative philosophy prevalent before the French Revolution. This negative philosophy was more concerned with emotional and speculative questions, and it aimed to change society through utopian alternatives to existing situations.

Positivists considered such speculation as “negative” because it lacked constructive and practical elements. They believed that philosophy, like other sciences, should focus on tangible objects and observable circumstances. This practical approach was referred to as the positive approach.

Comte himself wanted to guide the development of society but emphasized that the nature of positivism is not to destroy, but to organize. He aimed to replace the disorder created by the revolution with an organized development. Comte identified “free speculation” or “systematic doubt” as the metaphysical principle.

Metaphysics was later defined as dealing with things beyond our senses or independent of them. Comte considered metaphysical questions as unscientific and believed that in a positive society, scientific knowledge would replace or render free speculation unnecessary. (Holt-Jensen, A. (1981). Introduction to theoretical geography. Pion.)

In 1829, Auguste Comte published a book containing his lectures on the philosophy of positivism. Comte’s positivist philosophy consisted of five fundamental principles:

1. Scientific knowledge must be based on direct experience of reality. Direct observation is the most reliable way to ensure that the knowledge we acquire is scientific.

2. Direct experience of reality should be complemented by unity of scientific method. This means that different branches of knowledge should be distinguished by what they study, rather than how they study it. Science differs in subject matter, not methodology.

3. The concept of unity of scientific method requires a common scientific goal of formulating testable theories. This means that subjective value judgments have no place in scientific inquiry. Value judgments are based on ethical assertions and cannot be verified through scientific observation.

4. Positivism emphasizes the usefulness of scientific knowledge. All scientific knowledge should serve a practical purpose. It should be applicable and serve as a tool for social engineering.

5. Scientific knowledge is considered to be unfinished and relative. As knowledge progresses, theories are gradually unified, leading to a deeper understanding of social laws. Increased awareness necessitates more comprehensive theories.

These principles of positivism laid the foundation for Comte’s philosophy and approach to scientific knowledge.

Positivism, sometimes referred to as “empiricism,” holds the main idea that science should focus only on “empirical questions” which pertain to factual content, rather than “normative questions” about values and intentions. Empirical questions deal with how things really are in the world.

In this context, “reality” is defined as the tangible world that can be sensed and experienced. Science is concerned with studying the objects in this world, while the subjective experiences of individuals are not within its scope.

Positivism argues that we cannot investigate moral norms or justify our personal preferences using our senses. Normative questions should be avoided, as science’s role is to describe how things are and uncover the causal relationships that explain why things are the way they are through experimentation or other measurements. Ideally, science aims to be value-free, neutral, impartial, and objective.

In seventeenth-century England, periods of intense political conflict intermittently supported independent research. Francis Bacon developed the scientific method, emphasizing the importance of factual data derived from sensory evidence. John Locke put forth the basic positivist principle that all knowledge comes from sensory evidence: if something cannot be derived from sensory evidence, it is not considered knowledge. Reliable knowledge can only be obtained through direct observation of actual conditions. Being scientific means being objective, truthful, and neutral.

Comte, who later defined positivism as a scientific ideal in line with Locke’s principles, believed that alongside the natural sciences, there should also be a science of social relationships based on the same principles. Just as the natural sciences discovered the laws of nature, the scientific study of communities would uncover the laws of society.

Comte acknowledged that social phenomena are more complex than natural phenomena, but he strongly believed that the governing laws of society would eventually be discovered, and subjective elements in research would be eliminated. This belief forms the core of Comte’s proposition that social development occurs in three stages: theological (when everything is explained by God’s will), metaphysical, and positive (when causal connections are discovered between empirically observed phenomena).

During the nineteenth century, positivism emphasized the importance of empirical data and replicable research methods, leading to significant advancements in science. This approach considered metaphysical questions as unscientific, prompting science to establish its own objectives that were free from belief and value assumptions. Positivism promotes an anti-authoritarian stance by requiring empirical evidence and controlled investigations before accepting any beliefs.

In the 1920s, a group of scientists called the logical positivists emerged in Vienna, with Rudolf Carnap as a leading philosopher. They modernized positivism and expanded its core principle, arguing that formal logic, pure mathematics, and evidence from our senses provide reliable knowledge. Logical positivism distinguished between two types of statements:

1. Analytical statements: These are a priori propositions whose truth is guaranteed by their internal definitions (tautologies). They belong to the domain of formal sciences like logic and mathematics, which are crucial for maintaining coherence.

2. Synthetic statements: Their truth needs to be empirically established through conventional hypothesis testing. These revisions offered empirical inquiry a more secure basis than the earlier Comtean model. This framework also welcomed the advancements in geography (Harvey, 1969). However, Karl Popper’s principle of falsification later challenged the verification principle, which was considered a hallmark of the factual sciences.

As a scientific framework, logical positivism focuses on acquiring knowledge through accepted scientific procedures of observation and analysis. This knowledge takes the form of general statements that can be used to manipulate phenomena and achieve desired outcomes.

Positivists embrace three related doctrines: scientism (positivist method as the only true approach to knowledge acquisition), scientific politics (positivism as the foundation for rational problem-solving in society and social engineering), and value-freedom (scientific judgments being objective and independent of moral or political commitments).

The logical positivists strongly opposed metaphysics and unverifiable phenomena. As a result, they became staunch opponents of Nazism, which they viewed as a combination of irrational prejudice and ideological dogma. In Nazi Germany, the term “positivist” was used as an insult, and it was applied to figures like Alfred Hettner. Moritz Schlick, the leader of the Vienna Circle, was murdered by the Nazis, and other members were forced to flee abroad (Holt-Jensen, 1981).

The cumulative effect of these five claims was a progression from immediate experiences to a unitary method and eventually to universal laws. This resulted in a closed system centered around a particular version of the present, excluding alternative ways of perceiving and acting in the world.

Interestingly, geography’s founders, such as Kant and Humboldt, rejected the simplistic empiricism of Comte’s system and developed sophisticated philosophical systems in its place. However, paradoxically, many subsequent developments in geography accepted some or all of the positivist assumptions.

Consequently, when these assumptions were formalized during the quantitative revolution of the 1950s and 1960s, the resulting “New Geography” was more of a logical extension of ideas already embraced by many geographers rather than a radical departure (ibid., 358). Geography, as a discipline, became influenced by positivism and took a “positivist-led” direction.

Human geography embraced positivism more extensively compared to other social sciences. It adopted a systematic approach instead of a regional one, and several scholars introduced this new paradigm in urban and economic geography, as well as various branches of physical geography. This approach aimed to verify everything we perceive in the phenomenal world through sensory perception.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the New Geography, also known as “Quantitative Geography,” emerged. It focused on analyzing spatial data, developing spatial theory, and constructing and testing mathematical models of spatial processes. This shift marked a transition from the previous inductive regional approach to a systematic and deductive nomological approach.

The notion of positivism or logical positivism found acceptance as a principle, bringing a scientific approach to the discipline. Modern geography, developed after World War II, emphasized the predictive aspects of physical and social phenomena and was grounded in a nomothetic foundation.

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